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Why You Should Care About the 
Threatened Middle Class
JILL LITTRELL
FRED BROOKS 
JAN IVERY
MARY L. OHMER
Georgia State University
In the last two decades, the income and security of the individual 
middle class worker has declined and the gap between the middle 
class and the wealthy has widened. We explain how this is bad for 
democracy, the economy, and the aggregate health of the nation. 
We examine the governmental policies and interventions that in-
creased the middle class following the depression and maintained 
its vigor through the post-World War II period. The impetus for 
these changes in governmental policies in the 1930s was to end 
the Great Depression. We pose the question of whether a nation 
can recover from a depression without invigorating the middle 
class. We conclude that in order to recover from the current eco-
nomic and ﬁ nancial crisis, the middle class must be strengthened.
Key words: middle class, depression, economy, social justice, New 
Deal
Since the early 1970s, income distribution in America 
has become much less equitable (Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002; 
Krugman, 2007; Piketty & Saez, 2003; Reich, 2007). Both the 
bottom quintile and the middle quintile of earners have de-
creased in their share of the nation’s aggregated earned income. 
For the middle class, the proportion of earned income dropped 
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from a 1967 ﬁ gure of 17.3% to a ﬁ gure of 14.6% in 2005. For the 
bottom quintile, the proportion dropped from 4.0% in 1967 to 
3.4% in 2005. Who gained? The top quintile rose from 43.8% 
in 1967 to 50.4% in 2005. Table 1 presents the trends in tabular 
form, where it is clear that the middle quintile shows the steep-
est decline.
Table 1: Distribution (in percentages) of all earned income across 
various quintiles: 1967 to 2005
Income
Quintiles 1967 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Lowest   4.0   4.1   4.4   4.3   4.0   3.9   3.7   3.6   3.4
Second 10.8 10.8 10.5 10.3   9.7   9.6   9.1   8.9   8.6
Middle 17.3 17.4 17.1 16.9 16.3 15.9 15.2 14.8 14.6
Fourth 24.2 24.5 24.8 24.9 24.6 24.0 23.3 23.0 23.0
Highest 43.8 43.3 43.2 43.7 45.3 46.6 48.7 49.8 50.4
Notes: 2005 average income: $10,655 for lowest quintile, $27,357 for second, $46,301 
for middle, $72,825 for fourth, and $159,583 for highest.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2005). Current Population Survey, 1968 to 2006 Annual 
Social and Economic Supplements
The reality facing the middle class may be clearer looking 
at the average income over time (using adjusted dollars). The 
post-World War II period in America was a prosperous time 
for the average earner. After World War II, the typical family 
income doubled from $22,000 in today’s prices to $44,000 
(Krugman, 2007, p. 55). While household income has risen 
from 1973 to 2007, more households were represented by 
two working adults (Palley, 1998, p. 63; Pew Research Center, 
2008; Sawhill & Morton, 2007). From 1974 to 2004, for males in 
their 30s, individual median income declined by 12% (Sawhill 
& Morton, 2007). From 2000 to 2004, the incomes of college 
graduates declined by 5% (Krugman, 2006). From 2000 to 2007, 
wages for full-time, employed men were stagnant and middle 
class household incomes were lower by $300 in 2007 adjusted 
dollars (Bernstein, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2008).
While income is a measure of economic prosperity, wealth 
from property or stocks can also be examined in order to de-
termine how middle class America is doing. The ﬁ gures here 
mirror the disparities seen in income levels. From the 1970s 
to 2007, the nation’s richest 1% have more than doubled their 
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share of the nation’s wealth (Reich, 2007, p. 114). The richest 
1% owns 39% of the nation’s total assets, including real estate 
(Wolff, 1998). The top 1% own 49.5% of all stocks while the top 
10% own 83.6% of stocks (Palley, 1998, p. 58). In terms of all 
investments (stocks, bonds, trusts, business equity, three quar-
ters of home real estate values) the top 10% owns 90% (Wolff, 
1998).
In comparing the United States to other Western countries, 
America exhibits a much less equitable distribution of wealth 
than other countries (Brandolini & Smeeding, 2007; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005). This is noted on two indices of income distribu-
tion: the Gini index and the Decile Ratio. (Speciﬁ c numbers 
are presented in Table 2.) Moreover, considering the probabil-
ity of moving out of poverty in any given year, chances are 
lower in American than in other Western countries (Kawachi 
& Kennedy, 2002, p. 166) and the chances of attaining a higher 
economic standing than one’s parents is lower in the United 
States than in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Canada, Sweden, 
Germany, and France (Corak, 2006).
Table 2: Measures of Income Inequality: The U.S. 
compared to Selected Industrial Countries 
Country Gini Index2004
Decile Ratio
2000
United States 0.47 5.7
United Kingdom 0.36 4.6
Australia 0.35 4.2
France 0.33 3.4
Germany 0.28 3.4
Sweden 0.25 3.0
Japan 0.25 4.2
Denmark 0.25 2.8
Higher numbers suggest more inequality
Source for Gini Index: United Nations Human Development Report, 2004; 
Source for Decile Ratio: Brandolini & Smeeding, 2007, p. 30
Hacker (2006, 2007) has examined the transfer of risk in 
the society to the average American over the last two decades. 
Hacker calls this transfer “the great American risk shift.” The 
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unemployment rate is increasing, while household debt has 
increased (Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2006). The probabil-
ity of experiencing a decline in income level (called economic 
instability) increased between 1969 and 2002 for both those 
without a college degree and those with college educations 
(Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2000, p. 117) . In fact, the prob-
ability of experiencing a 50% drop in income was 7% in 1970 
and rose to 17% in 2002 (Hacker, 2007). Figure 1 represents this 
pattern. 
Figure 1. Income Instability Increased at Both High and Low 
Educational Levels
Retirement futures are more insecure as well. In 1980, 
83% of ﬁ rms offered pensions with ﬁ xed beneﬁ ts for life. By 
2003, only one third of Americans had guaranteed pensions 
and more had 401Ks (Hacker, 2007). 401Ks are, of course, very 
risky because their value ﬂ uctuates with the stock market. 
Ghilarducci (2008) estimates that 50% of retirees will run short 
of their ﬁ nancial needs in the future, ending up with less than 
70% of their pre-retirement income upon retirement. 
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Manifestations of a Stressed Middle Class
Between 1970 and 2001, bankruptcies quintupled, mortgage 
foreclosures tripled, and car repossessions doubled (Warren & 
Tyagi, 2003 p. 78-80). Most people ﬁ ling for bankruptcy are 
middle class: they are well educated, own their own homes, 
and have good jobs. Persons with children are more likely to 
ﬁ le for bankruptcy than are households without children. For 
90% of those households with children who ﬁ le for bankruptcy 
the reasons fall into three categories: job loss, medical expens-
es, and divorce. Of course, these disasters are more likely today 
than in the 1950s and l960s. Even before the recent ﬁ nancial 
meltdown of 2008, involuntary layoffs had increased by 28% 
since 1970 (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 82). Displaced workers 
are unlikely to ﬁ nd employment at similar pay (Hacker, 2007). 
The cost of medical care has escalated. Fewer Americans carry 
health insurance. Indeed, one-third of non-elderly adults have 
periods during which they have no medical insurance (Hacker, 
2007). Financial pressures place a burden on marriages in a 
country with an already high divorce rate.
The absence of savings by the American public and the in-
crease in indebtedness of those who are middle class have led 
to the common assumption that the middle class is spending 
on luxuries they cannot afford. Fortunately, the government 
has kept statistics on the spending patterns of American con-
sumers since the l970s. Contrary to what might be believed, 
spending on most categories has declined over the last two 
decades. Americans spend 21% less on clothing, 22% less on 
food, and 44% less on major appliances than they did in the 
early 1970s. What has increased? Health insurance costs have 
escalated. With two parents in the workforce, child care is a 
new expense, as is the necessity of a second car. (Seventy-ﬁ ve 
percent of three- and four-year-olds attended preschool in 2001 
compared to just four percent in 1960.) Moreover, the cost of 
housing has escalated 26% between 1984 and 2001. Are homes 
more luxurious today? In fact, 6 out of 10 of families live in 
older homes; however, the size of new homes has increased 
by 40% over the last twenty years (Warren & Tyagi, 2003). 
According to Warren and Tyagi (2003), the major factor driving 
the increase in the cost of housing is the competition to move 
into good school districts, although Shiller (2008) argues that 
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cheap interest rates also contributed to inﬂ ated housing prices. 
Comparing houses of similar size and luxury, a ﬁ ve percent 
jump in standardized test scores of children in one school dis-
trict versus another adds $4,000 to the cost of the house. School 
quality is the single most important factor in determining 
the price of a house (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, pp. 15-54). Thus, 
contrary to the perception that today’s Americans suffer from 
some form of impaired impulse control (see Whybrow, 2005), 
the long-term goal of raising children who can become pros-
perous adults is driving America’s current consumption.
As the housing bubble grew, along with the rush to buy 
housing in better school districts, home equity loans and mort-
gages became much easier to obtain. In 1980, Congress passed 
the Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act and then, 
in 1982, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act. This 
legislation effectively deregulated bank interest rates, allow-
ing higher interest rates from borrowers and permitting higher 
interest rates to depositors (lenders) (Mansﬁ eld, 2000). In the 
past, down-payments of 20% were required when buying a 
new home (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, pp. 127-129). In the environ-
ment leading up to the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, 
down payments were sometimes not required at all. All this led 
to higher mortgage payments, so the proportion of monthly 
earnings going to mortgages increased. A new term has been 
created for those devoting in excess of 40% of monthly income 
to housing: house poor (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 133). Over 
the past twenty years the number of middle class households 
that are “house poor” quadrupled, from 2.8% in 1975 to 13.5% 
in 2001 (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 231). 
Advocates for the poor have sometimes lobbied for easier 
access to mortgages, in part by requesting smaller down pay-
ments and even an absence of down payments. Are borrow-
ers being helped by an absence of down payments? Without a 
down payment, borrowers are paying higher costs in interest 
rates, higher points and fees, and are required to carry manda-
tory credit insurance (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 133). Effectively, 
they pay more. Tellingly, the percentage of household dispos-
able income spent on debt service—principally mortgage, 
auto loan, and credit card debt had risen from just over 10% 
in 1983 to 14.5% in 2006 (Phillips, 2007, p. 99). The median 
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debt-to-annual-income ratio for middle-income adults in-
creased from 0.45 in 1983 to 1.19 in 2004. The median debt-to-
asset ratio of middle income adults increased from 0.25 in 1983 
to 0.40 in 2004 (Pew Research Center, 2008).
What were banks getting out of deregulation? In the past, 
the cap on interest rates meant that banks could not offset in-
creased risk with higher proﬁ tability attributable to higher in-
terest rates. Banks were reluctant to provide loans that could 
not be repaid. With deregulation, the allure of high proﬁ ts 
(from high interest rates on the loan) lured the banking indus-
try into riskier practices. Before the mass crisis in the banking 
industry in the fall of 2008, while loan defaults soared, banking 
proﬁ ts increased even faster (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 129). 
Prior to the recent collapse of the housing market, houses were 
appreciating in value over time. Financial institutions stood to 
realize an even bigger proﬁ t if a foreclosure ensued. Foreclosed 
properties could be resold at a higher price than the amount 
of the foreclosed loan (Engel & McCoy, 2002; Warren & Tyagi, 
2003, p. 136). Up until the advent of massive foreclosures and 
the collapse of housing prices, banks had everything to gain by 
offering big, risky loans.
The shift in how the middle class spends its money has ef-
fectively made life more risky. A higher proportion of income 
is going to ﬁ xed monthly payments: mortgage, insurance, 
daycare, car payments (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 8). Lower 
proportions of the pay check are going to categories such as 
food, clothing, and movies, areas where there is ﬂ exibility (that 
is, room to conserve). If a ﬁ nancial disaster occurs (job loss, 
divorce, unforeseen health problems), there are limits to how 
much families can cut back. Often people fall into the trap of 
using their credit cards to make ends meet at the end of the pay 
period when the money runs out (Ellis, 1998; Warren & Tyagi, 
2003, p. 113). (In the last 20 years, savings declined from 11% 
to negative 1 percent. Credit card debt increased from 4% to 
12% of income [Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 112].) When families 
cannot make the augmenting payments on the credit cards, 
they frequently resort to taking out a home equity loan to pay 
off the credit card debt (Barr, 2007; Sullivan et al., 2006, p. 251; 
Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 131). However, the new loan adds its 
own burden of interest payments, so many are forced to ﬁ le 
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for bankruptcy. At the time of bankruptcy ﬁ ling, the average 
family owed 150% of an entire year’s income in non-mortgage 
debt (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 78). 
What changes have occurred making all this debt possible? 
Similar to the expansion of credit in the home equity market, 
the credit card industry was deregulated and the rules have 
changed (Ellis, 1998). In 1978, the Supreme Court (in Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation) 
ruled that the laws in the state where the credit card company is 
incorporated prevail over the laws in the state where the debtor 
resides. Not surprisingly, credit card companies are located in 
states (South Dakota and Delaware) that do not have usury 
laws. Effectively, usury laws no longer exist. Credit card com-
panies can raise the interest rates on the amount already bor-
rowed when an individual loses a good credit rating, or when 
the card company summarily decides to lower the maximum 
amount that can be borrowed and the debtor is above the new 
limit. When a person fails to pay the minimum payment on a 
card, the interest rates (on what is already owed) increase and 
penalty fees are added. The principal as well as the interest on 
the debt augments. Monthly minimum payment amounts go 
up (Fanning & Rummel, 2004).
The real incomes of the middle class have declined over 
the last twenty years. Their share of America’s wealth has de-
clined. Expenses have escalated. With two adults working, a 
second car usually is a necessity. The cost of borrowing money 
has increased. With both adults now participating in the work-
force, the insurance policy of being able to add a second bread-
winner should disaster occur has been lost (Warren & Tyagi, 
2003). The middle class is far less secure.
Why Is A Strong Middle Class Important?
“When citizens of different countries have been polled 
about attitudes toward income inequality, Americans come out 
near the bottom in their dislike of wide disparities” (Kawachi 
& Kennedy, 2002, p. 25). In fact, only 28% of Americans polled 
in a World Values survey responded favorably to policies to 
reduce inequalities versus 65% in the United Kingdom and 80% 
in Italy (Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002). Kawachi and Kennedy 
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(2002) point out that “Strikingly, even the poor in America are 
less likely to endorse redistributive or egalitarian sentiments 
than low-income citizens elsewhere” (p. 25). Americans seem 
to have bought the assumption that income disparity is an in-
evitable outcome of differentials in productivity that accrue 
from differences in skills and innate ability (Galbraith, 2008). 
They make this assumption oblivious to the fact that during 
the last 20 years increases in wages have failed to keep up with 
increases in worker productivity (Dew-Becker & Gordon, 2006; 
Krugman, 2007; Sawhill & Morton, 2007). 
A Strong Middle Class Is Required for a Democracy
Aristotle was perhaps the ﬁ rst to recognize that govern-
ment by the middle class produced the best results. The poor 
would be captured by a demagogue who would bring tyranny 
for the promise of income redistribution. The rich would be 
invested in maintaining their position of privilege. Only the 
middle class could govern rationally. Aristotle advocated 
policies that would: (a) generate and maintain a prosperous 
middle class; (b) provide careers, property, and education for 
the poor to absorb them into the middle class; and (c) encour-
age the rich to contribute a portion of their wealth to careers 
for the poor and to civic projects for the society as a whole. 
Aristotle’s motivation to maintain a strong middle class ema-
nated from his belief that only middle class governance could 
provide harmony and stability and avert frequent revolutions 
and blood letting (Glassman, 1995). 
Indeed, Aristotle’s fears are mirrored in the current loss 
of civility and bipartisanship since the 1950s and 1960s when 
more people had attained economic security (Krugman, 2007). 
Moreover, using country as the unit of analysis ﬁ nds that those 
countries with high levels of inequality exhibit high levels of 
instability of government (Perotti, 1996).
Historical analysis reveals that the emergence of a middle 
class brought about a shift from governance by the king to 
governance by the people. Barrington Moore’s (1966) classic 
work on development of modern forms of governments ﬁ nds 
that evolution from a feudal society structure was occasioned 
by the emergence of a middle class in cities. As these middle 
class individuals grew in numbers, they demanded more 
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representation in assemblies and more constitutional rights. 
Others have also recognized that during the middle ages, 
nascent democratic movements were contingent upon a middle 
class whose wealth emanated from commerce (Glassman, 1995, 
p. 49, p. 84; North & Thomas, 1973).
While a strong middle class seems to be necessary for a 
democracy, there are examples of countries with strong middle 
classes where democratic governance is lacking. Singapore 
has a large middle class, has business transactions governed 
by rule of law and courts, but does not elect its leaders. The 
former Soviet Union is another country with an educated 
middle class in which leaders were not fairly and democrati-
cally elected (Glassman, 1995). Many recognize that Hitler’s 
Germany was a case of the middle class choosing fascism over 
democracy. Times of uncertainty (either economic recessions 
or external military threats) seem to increase the possibility 
that the middle class will move toward fascism (Moore, 1966). 
We are not claiming that a strong middle class guarantees a de-
mocracy, but rather, that democracy will not develop without 
a middle class.
Political scientists Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) suggest 
that the presence of a strong middle class is a prerequisite for 
stable democracy. In their analysis, Acemoglu and Robinson 
take into consideration the costs to the rich of suppressing a 
poor majority. They offer detailed calculations to show that 
when the majority has few, or limited, resources undergird-
ing its demands, the costs of oppression are reduced for the 
rich. However, a strong middle class has conﬁ dence, a sense of 
entitlement, and resources. (Indeed, all revolutions have been 
led by the middle-class [Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, p. 39].) 
Given a strong middle class, it becomes too costly for would-
be oppressors to mount the mechanisms of subjugation. Some 
form of broad-based participation in decision making becomes 
a more pragmatic solution. Lipset (1981) reaches similar 
conclusions.
For the founding Fathers, an equitable distribution of wealth 
and property was seen as crucial to sustaining a democratic 
republic (Huston, 1998). On visits to Europe, Ben Franklin, 
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were shocked by the dis-
parities in wealth they observed between the aristocracy and 
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common people (Gates & Collins, 2002). After visiting Ireland 
& Scotland, Ben Franklin wrote: 
In these countries a small part of the society are 
landlords, great Noblemen and Gentlemen, extreamly 
(sic) opulent, living in the highest afﬂ uence and 
magniﬁ cence: The bulk of people Tenants, extreamly 
(sic) poor, living in the most sordid Wretchedness in 
dirty hovels of mud and straw, and cloathed (sic) only 
in rags. (Willcox, 1975, p. 7)
Later in this same letter Franklin attributed the enormous 
inequality he observed in Europe to the aristocratic form of 
government: “And the effect of this kind of Civil Society seems 
only to be, the depressing multitudes below the Savage State 
that a few may be rais’d (sic) above it” (Willcox, 1975, p. 7).
John Adams agreed with the 17th century political philoso-
pher James Harrington, who believed that power in society 
was determined by those who owned property (Adams, 1854). 
According to John Adams: 
…the balance of power in society, accompanies the 
balance of property in land. The only possible way, then, 
of preserving the balance of power on the side of equal 
liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition 
of land easy to every member of society; to make a 
division of the land into small quantities, so that the 
multitude may be possessed of landed estates. If the 
multitude is possessed of the balance of real estate, the 
multitude will have the balance of power, and in that 
case the multitude will take care of the liberty, virtue, 
and interest of the multitude, in all acts of government. 
(Adams, 1854, pp. 376-377)
In agrarian Colonial America wealth was largely determined 
by ownership of land. 
Of course, one strong reason for opposing concentrated 
wealth is the undue inﬂ uence afforded to the rich. Woodrow 
Wilson stated in 1913 (p. 286), “If there are men in this country 
big enough to own the government of the United States, they 
are going to own it.” Studies of small communities, such as the 
classic Middletown study (Lynd & Lynd, 1937), bear out that 
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those with more resources can buy advertising and manipulate 
what the public hears. Concomitant with the concentration of 
wealth in the U.S., we have witnessed the rise of lobbying in 
Congress and growing concerns over corruption. Campaign 
contributions do buy access to legislators (Stratmann, 2005). 
Congressmen who succeed in passing legislation for particular 
industries are rewarded, after leaving ofﬁ ce, with high salary 
jobs as spokespersons for the industries. Financial resources do 
inﬂ uence election results (Repetti, 2001). Reich (2007, p. 166) 
argues that super-capitalism (referring to the current state of 
America with the rich capturing a greater proportion of ag-
gregate income) has diverted the attention of Congress from 
guarding and promoting the interests of citizens to regulat-
ing disputes between corporate interests. In the wars between 
the powerful, the interests of citizens have been forgotten. For 
example, in 1963, Congress passed six bills out of ten to reduce 
economic inequality; again in 1979, it passed four bills out of 
seven to that same end; whereas in 1991, it passed only two out 
of seven aimed at reducing inequality.
Beyond the threat to good government posed by the con-
centration of wealth is the issue of equality of opportunity. 
The founding fathers were concerned with having a society 
of equal opportunity. However, Krugman (2007, p. 249) re-
ﬂ ects, “A society with highly unequal results is, more or less 
inevitably, a society with highly unequal opportunity, too.” 
The wealthy will be better able to invest in the education of 
their children. Their children have more time to devote to their 
education. A superior education implies that the children of 
the wealthy will emerge with better skills. Of course, societal 
investment in public schools and libraries could offset some of 
the factors militating against equality of opportunity. However, 
only through clearly progressive taxing, that is, a further shift 
of the tax burden onto the wealthy, with less allowance for in-
genious opting out of taxation, will there be sufﬁ cient revenue 
to support these institutions. 
Inequality is Bad for the Health of Persons at All Levels of Income
The Whitehall studies have shown us that with each 
decrease in level of socioeconomic status, various indica-
tors (mortality, morbidity, risk for heart disease) mark a 
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deterioration in health (Marmot, 2004; Salpolsky, 2005). 
Childhood economic status also affects adult health. Both the 
risk of infectious disease and heart disease is higher in persons 
whose parents had low incomes when they were growing up, 
regardless of adult socioeconomic status (SES) (Cohen, Doyle, 
Turner, Alper, & Skoner, 2003; Kivirmäki et al., 2004; Lehman, 
Taylor, Kiefe, & Seeman, 2005). The ﬁ ndings of the SES gradi-
ent in health are found in nations with universal health care, 
so unequal access is not a likely explanation. Moreover, the 
ﬁ ndings hold after controlling for diet, exercise, and smoking 
(Lantz et al., 1998; Steptoe & Marmot, 2002, p. 44). 
What is most surprising in the health research is the com-
parisons of countries with narrow gaps between the top earners 
and the bottom (e.g., Greece and Japan) to countries with wide 
disparities (e.g., the United States). At all levels of income, the 
health status of persons from the more egalitarian countries is 
better (Babones, 2008; Marmot, 2004, p. 65; Wilkinson, 2005, 
pp. 100-143). According to Wilkinson (1992, p. 49) the degree 
of income inequality in a society explains about three quar-
ters of the variation in life expectancy across countries; per 
capita Gross National Product explains about 10% of the vari-
ance. Studies in which states are the unit of an analysis have 
produced similar ﬁ ndings (Kaplan, Pamuk, Lynch, Cohen, & 
Balfour, 1996; Kennedy, Kawachi, & Prothrow-Stith, 1996) as 
has a study in which the unit of analysis was U.S. metropoli-
tan areas (Lynch et al., 1998). However, at the neighborhood 
level, poor individuals usually enjoy better health in a mixed 
income neighborhood than in neighborhoods with concen-
trated poverty (Stafford & Marmot, 2003). Also, the associa-
tion between regional income inequality and life expectancy 
does not hold up in Canada, where across provinces there is 
not much variation in income distribution (Ross & Wolfson, 
1999).
Researchers have yet to identify the mechanisms through 
which large income disparities impact the health of all persons 
in the society. However, particular variables such as social 
capital (measuring whether people view others as trustworthy 
and participate in voluntary organizations) have been shown 
to impact health (Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002). Comparing 
countries with narrower gaps between the top earners and the 
bottom ﬁ nds that the citizens of countries with narrower gaps 
are more trusting of others and report higher levels of satisfac-
tion (Ellison, 1999; Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002, pp. 102, 110). 
Essentially, social cohesion is more likely to develop among in-
dividuals who are of similar social status. Perhaps the greater 
social cohesion affords health beneﬁ ts for everyone.
A Strong Middle Class is Required for a Market 
Economy with High Productivity and Growth
A large middle class is vital to a capitalist economy because 
the middle class spends on consumer goods. The middle class 
is the market. Economists have long known that middle class 
individuals spend proportionately more of their income (have 
a marginal propensity to consume), whereas wealthy individ-
uals have a marginal propensity to save (Mankiw, 2003, p. 54). 
Henry Ford recognized this fundamental truth when he raised 
the wages of the workers so that they could afford to buy the 
automobiles they were mass producing. Presently, between 62-
70% of current Gross Domestic Product (deﬁ ned as the money 
that changes hands in America) is constituted of consumer 
spending (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006, p. 283; Mankiw, 2003, 
p. 27). Without the expectation of selling the goods that get 
produced, no one will build a factory or employ workers. If 
consumer spending declines, there is no incentive to invest in 
new companies and industries. Job creation stagnates. 
The emphasis on consumer demand as the impetus for eco-
nomic growth is referred to as “demand led growth theory.” 
“Supply side” theory emphasizes investment’s role in eco-
nomic growth. It is true that there must be some money to 
invest. To generate investment dollars, some of the difference 
between the selling price of a product and the cost of produc-
tion must go into investment (as opposed to workers’ wages). 
Those individuals in the society with the highest marginal pro-
pensity to save (the wealthy) must be left with some after-tax 
dollars to invest. But, will those with excess money use their 
savings to increase factory resources and/or open new busi-
nesses and create new jobs, without an expectation that a sufﬁ -
cient number of consumers will be able to buy their products?
During the Reagan years in the 1980s, when there was 
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much deregulation of ﬁ nancial institutions, we witnessed al-
ternatives for the use of investment dollars beyond creating 
new companies and new jobs. In the era of “hostile takeovers 
and leveraged buyouts,” persons with money to invest bought 
up companies, closed sectors of the company where union-
ized workers had negotiated high-wage contracts, and effec-
tively eliminated many jobs (Uchitelle, 2007). Proﬁ ts can be 
used to invest in overseas production, as well as being used to 
buy up company stocks to raise stock values (Madrick, 2007). 
Managers of hedge funds specialize in making money through 
speculation. The realization that companies can use proﬁ ts in 
other ways, besides buying new equipment that could enhance 
production and employ more people, may explain a recent 
paradox. Between 2001 and 2006, proﬁ ts had risen to approxi-
mately 15% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but capital in-
vestment fell as a share of GDP by 2 percentage points from the 
high in 1999 (Madrick, 2007, p. 3). Until the recent downturn, 
the availability of funds for investment was not a problem. Ira 
Glass (2008) reports that since 2002, investment funds have 
doubled. The frenzy to invest prompted the sub-prime housing 
loans which ended in the recent banking crisis.
So when will investment dollars be used to create new 
companies? Adam Smith, who recognized that when goods 
(e.g., pins) are mass produced, unit prices decline owing to an 
economy of scale, also cautioned, “the beneﬁ ts of such enhanced 
potential productivity are only realized if the market is large 
enough to absorb the new supply of pins” (Smith, 1776/1936). It 
is well to remember that when the causes of devastating African 
diseases are discovered, drug companies are not goaded into 
ﬁ nding a cure, because there is no market (Sattaur, 1990). Drug 
companies fail to develop drugs for malaria, which infects the 
third world, because without consumers who can pay, there is 
no incentive (Thurow, 2003, p. 179). James Watt, an investor in 
the mass production of the steam engine, is quoted as saying, 
“it is not worth my while to manufacture in three countries 
only; but I can ﬁ nd it very worthwhile to make it for the whole 
world” (Mokyr, 1992, p. 245). Moreover, economists have 
credited the growth of the American economy to America’s 
enormous, continent-wide population (Madrick, 2007, p. 12), 
whereas others credit the industrial revolution to the market 
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expansion occasioned by world trade (Cameron & Neal, 2003). 
Rather than technological innovations leading to growth in the 
world economy, Madrick (2002, pp. 2-12) concludes that an in-
crease in world markets stimulated the growth in the world 
economy of modern times.
If demand is required for investment and high wages in-
crease demand, then localities with higher wages should 
realize more economic growth. Researchers have examined 
how increases in worker wages covary with economic growth. 
Naastepad and Strom (2006-2007) analyzed data for eight 
economies (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, 
Britain, and the U.S.) for two periods: 1960-1980 and 1980-
2001. They found that when wages were high, there was less 
unemployment and a greater rise in GDP. Alternatively, when 
wages declined, although corporate proﬁ ts increased, these 
periods were associated with greater unemployment and with 
less growth in a country’s GDP. 
There are also data on the relationship between the level 
of income inequality (which will increase with lower wages) 
and economic growth. Comparisons of countries differing on 
the degree of equality of income distribution have concluded 
that there is an inverse correlation between inequality and 
economic growth (Aghion, Caroli, & García-Peñalosa, 1999; 
Alesina & Rodrick, 1994; Persson, & Tabellini, 1994), although 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that the inverse relationship 
between high inequality and economic growth was limited to 
democracies. Furthermore, in the Persson and Tabellini data, 
a larger middle class was associated with greater investment 
within a country. Similarly, Repetti (2001) reviewed studies in 
which economic units were observed over a 25 year period. 
Repetti concluded that concentration of wealth is associated 
with less economic growth over the long run, while the corre-
lation is less clear over shorter time intervals (Repetti, 2001).
The Case for Progressive Taxation 
Mechanisms are available for ensuring a healthy middle 
class: higher wages and progressive income taxation. Those 
who emphasize the supply side of economic growth object 
to increasing wages and increasing taxes on the wealthy. If 
business people have their proﬁ ts taxed at, for example, 91% 
(the level during the 1950s) rather than at 35% (the current 
level), it is argued that they will be less inclined to make invest-
ments with their accumulated proﬁ ts (Krugman, 2007, p. 47). 
Without new companies and expanded capacity of production, 
then economies of scale and increased productivity (amount 
produced by worker and machine) will not be achieved. The 
data, however, suggest that such fears are groundless.
Data are available allowing examination of the relationship 
between high taxes and economic growth. During the period in 
this country when we had the highest taxes on the rich and the 
top 1% of the economic hierarchy controlled less of the nation’s 
wealth, viz. 1950-1972, we witnessed better economic growth 
than in other times. The Multifactor productivity for the years 
1929-1996 were as follows: 1928-1950, 1.90%; 1950-1964, 2.35%; 
1964-1972, 2.07%; 1972-1979, 1.12%; 1979-1988, 0.90%; 1988-
1996, 0.67% (Gordon, 1999).
Others have compared countries to determine how taxa-
tion relates to a country’s level of economic growth. Using 
country as the unit of analysis, several researchers have found 
that high tax rates are associated with more, rather than less, 
economic growth (Lindert, 2004; Perotti, 1996; Slemrod, Gale, 
& Easterly, 1995), although these authors recognize that the 
many confounds of level of taxation with other variables (e.g., 
the amount of GDP in a country which emanates from agri-
cultural production) make it difﬁ cult to draw ﬁ rm conclusions 
about causation (Slemrod et al., 1995). However, examining 
their data, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) conclude that Wagner’s 
law is essentially correct. Wagner’s law states that government 
taxes and government spending will increase with increasing 
wealth of the country. 
There are a couple of arguments to be made about the fair-
ness of a progressive tax system. One such argument is called 
Engel’s law (about.com: Economics, 2009), named after the 
statistician Ernst Engel. Engel’s law states that as a consumer’s 
income increases, the proportion of income spent on food de-
clines. More generally, people with low incomes are forced to 
spend the bulk of their income on essentials just to survive. 
For the poor, any tax is likely to be a tax on essentials. For 
the wealthy, the taxes are on discretionary income. There is a 
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related economics law, the law of marginal utility, which holds 
that the more one has of a given commodity, the less the owner 
values any single unit of it (Cameron & Neal, 2003, p. 15). Thus, 
if fairness means equal discomfort for all under taxation, you 
would want to take larger amounts of money from the person 
who possesses more of it. 
Finally, it might be well to remember that those who have 
accumulated wealth in this country have not achieved their 
wealth exclusively on their own. Government-sponsored re-
search at universities, which ﬁ ll our academic journals and 
end up undergirding everything from pharmaceutical patents 
to new forms of plastic, are often implicated in new develop-
ments in the marketplace. There is also our precious heritage 
of an open society, where news travels with lightning speed, 
and promotes the expeditious interchanges that characterize 
our ﬁ nancial marketplace. More generally, our American insti-
tutions (including the ﬁ nancial markets themselves, the edu-
cational system, our physical infrastructure, civil courts, the 
patent ofﬁ ce, etc.) enable the accumulation of wealth. Thus, the 
society as a whole has a claim on the return on its investment 
(Gates & Collins, 2002, pp. 110-135).
Should We be Particularly Worried Now by the Insecure Middle 
Class?
Economists have argued that the cause of the Great 
Depression was insufﬁ cient consumer demand (Krugman, 
1997). Thurow (2003, p. 72) recognizes that the rest of the 
world relies on America to create demand, that is, to be the big 
market of spending consumers. Presently, world production 
capacity exceeds expected consumption by at least one third in 
almost every industry, suggesting that a deﬁ cit in demand is 
a world problem (Thurow, 2003, p. 248). Palley’s book, Plenty 
of Nothing, was written in 1998, prior to the 2008 collapse of 
the housing market and the country’s ﬁ nancial sector. Palley 
offered four reasons why the present diminution in middle 
class wages makes us vulnerable to a depression again: 
1.   As the disproportionately large cohort of baby 
boomers ages, the bulk of the population will be 
older. It is established that older people spend 
less than younger people. Thus, the aging of the 
population will contribute to the decline in demand. 
2.   In the manufacturing sector, the practice of paying 
over-time hours (as opposed to hiring additional 
workers) has increased. During a recession, these 
hours will be easy to cut. 
3.   The economy has fewer automatic stabilizers than in 
the past. For example, rather than increasing wages, 
workers have been compensated with bonuses 
tied to company proﬁ ts. When proﬁ ts decrease in a 
recession, compensation to workers also decreases. 
4.   Over the past several decades, Americans have 
maintained their standard of living by offsetting 
declining wages with increased borrowing and debt. 
Given present levels of indebtedness, another economic 
downturn with job losses will make it impossible to borrow 
further. Rather, more Americans will default on loans and go 
into bankruptcy. The picture is one of a contractionary spiral, 
“with wage deﬂ ation feeding collapse in spending, and col-
lapsing spending feeding further wage deﬂ ation” (Palley, 1998, 
p. 204). Palley’s concerns seem particularly cogent now, as we 
consider falling prices, job layoffs, and falling retail consump-
tion in the last year.
How Stimulating Recovery from the Great Depression 
Inadvertently Created the Middle Class
We have thus far argued that a strong middle class is re-
quired for maintaining democracy, the health of all citizens, 
and a vibrant economy. We have argued that in the past 20 
years, the vitality of the middle class has been vitiated. But, 
what created the large middle class which remained robust 
through the 1950 and 1960s? While there was a modest middle 
class in America prior to the Great Depression, the middle 
class gained in strength and numbers following the New Deal 
and World War II. Goldin and Margo (1992) report that wage 
inequality began to decrease with the passage of the First 
New Deal legislation in 1933, but the “Great Compression” 
continued throughout the 1940s. Economists believe that the 
“Great Compression” was effectively created by governmental 
policies: high marginal rates of taxation, the wage and price 
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controls in effect during World War II, and then policies bol-
stering labor extant during the 1950s (Krugman, 2007; Levy 
& Temlin, 2007; Murolo & Chitty, 2001; Piven, 2006). These 
policies were critical components of Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” 
Another component of the New Deal, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), was created in 1934. It provided 
mortgages to middle class Americans and was followed by 
more loans for returning veterans through the Veterans 
Administration. The GI Bill educated the masses and created a 
more productive workforce. All of these policies increased the 
size and vibrancy of the middle class. 
The New Deal was intended to bring recovery from the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. In fact, the early years of the 
New Deal did initiate some marginal recovery from stagna-
tion of the Great Depression. Some believe that the New Deal 
might have brought the nation out of depression; indeed, by 
August of 1937, unemployment had dropped from a high 
of 24.9% to 12.3% and production was up to 1929 levels 
(McElvaine, 1993, p. 297; Shlaes, 2007, p. 267; Smiley, 2002, p. 
106). However, in 1937, when taxes were increased in the form 
of payroll deductions for the newly initiated Social Security 
System, Roosevelt cut back on governmental spending, and 
money supply through the Federal Reserve was cut, a second 
recession occurred (Borosage & Lotke, 2009; Kuttner, 2009; 
McElvaine, 1993, p. 297). (The next big government stimulus 
package, World War II, effectively ended unemployment in 
America.) While the New Deal was initiated to bring an end 
to unemployment (i.e., end the depression), concomitantly, it 
also initiated the Great Compression, the narrowing of the gap 
between the rich and the poor. Could Roosevelt have ended 
unemployment and ended price deﬂ ation without increasing 
the size and security of the middle class? We do not have a 
case-study addressing the issue of whether economic recovery 
is possible without strengthening the economic security of the 
bulk of Americans. 
In responding to the 2008 ﬁ nancial system debacle and re-
cession, the Bush Administration was ready to infuse money 
into the banking system in order to ensure that American busi-
nesses could secure loans to keep their businesses running. 
While everyone agrees the liquidity is vital, some members of 
Congress were unwilling to ensure good wages for workers 
in the failing auto-industry or to intervene to prevent foreclo-
sures on those who could not make their mortgage payments. 
Deﬁ ning recovery from economic depression as restoring price 
stability and restoring full employment of the factors of pro-
duction, we suggest that recovery from an economic depres-
sion may not be possible without an increase in the economic 
security of the bulk of the population.
The housing market offers a case in point. Rationales for 
renegotiating loans to prevent foreclosures extend beyond 
compassion for the distressed. With the rash of foreclosures, 
vacant houses have offered a haven for drug dealers and 
criminals, increasing the cost of law enforcement (Mummolo 
& Brubaker, 2008). Additionally, given a glut of houses on the 
market, property values have collapsed, with prices falling by 
six percent during 2007 (Barr, 2008). Since more foreclosures 
are anticipated, shoppers for new homes will not buy because 
they are waiting for prices to fall to their lowest possible level. 
Consumer demand, necessary for stabilizing the price of 
homes, is lacking. 
Similar problems in the housing market occurred during 
the Great Depression. The newly created FHA purchased 
troubled mortgages from banks. The owner was then asked to 
repay the outstanding amount on the then current value of the 
home, rather than the amount of the original loan (Barr, 2008; 
Mansﬁ eld, 2000; Seidman & Jakabovics, 2008). Identifying 
which particular policies re-stabilized the housing market after 
the depression is difﬁ cult; many governmental initiatives were 
occurring under the New Deal. However, in line with our ar-
guments about why a middle class is required for an economy, 
we proffer the hypothesis that bringing an end to the current 
world recession/depression and stabilizing markets will 
require bolstering the middle class. Interventions to save cor-
porations will not work unless workers’ wages are also saved. 
Conclusions
Presently we are confronting another worldwide depres-
sion as we did in the 1930s (Meyerson, 2009). In 1930, the gov-
ernment instituted the New Deal to bring the country out of the 
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Great Depression. The New Deal policies initiated the “Great 
Compression,” widening the middle class and narrowing the 
gap between the rich and the poor. Presently, the government is 
going to intervene to improve the economy. In sculpting inter-
ventions to end the current depression/recession, the govern-
ment should look to the example of the New Deal and realize 
that interventions must revitalize the middle class. Recovery 
from depression may not be possible without strengthening 
the middle class. Certainly, a prosperous, harmonious, healthy 
society is not possible without a vibrant middle class. If the 
middle class is insecure, the outcomes of everyone are com-
promised. In this time of innovation, hopefully we will get it 
right.
References
About.com: Economics (2009). Engel’s law. Retrieved April 3, 2009 
from http://economics.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-
engels-law.htm
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic origins of dictatorship 
and democracy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Adams, C. F. (Ed.). (1854). The works of John Adams, second President of 
the United States. Vol IX. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Aghion, P., Caroli, E., & García-Peñalosa, C. (1999). Inequality and 
economic growth: The perspective of new growth theories. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 4, 1615-1617.
Alesina, A. & Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive politics and economic 
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 465-490.
Babones, S. (2008). Income inequality and population health: 
Correlation and causality. Social Science & Medicine, 66, 1614-
1626.
Barr, M. S. (2007). An inclusive, progressive national savings and 
ﬁ nancial services policy. Harvard Law and Policy Review, 1, 161-
184.
Barr, M. (2008). Strengthening our economy: Foreclosure prevention 
and neighborhood preservation. Center for American Progress. 
Retrieved January 4, 2009 from http://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2008/01/barr_testimony_html/
Bernstein, J. (2008). Median income rose as did poverty in 2007. 
Economic Policy Institute, Retrieved Decemeber 26, 2008 
from http://www. Epi.org/content.cfm./webfeatures_
econindicators_income_20080826.
Borosage, R. L., & Lotke, E. (2009, December 19). The new New Deal? 
The Nation, 9-14.
108    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
109
Brandolini, A., & Smeeding, T. A. (2007). Inequality patterns in Western-
type Democracies: Cross-country differences and time changes. Centre 
for Household, Income, Labour & Demographic Economics. 
Retrieved June 20, 2008 from http://www.child-center.it/
papers/child08_2007.pdf
Cameron, R., & Neal, L. (2003). A concise economic history of the world. 
New York: Oxford Press.
Cohen, S., Doyle, W. J., Turner, R. B., Alper, C. M., & Skoner, D. P. 
(2003). Childhood socioeconomic status and susceptibility to the 
common cold. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 652-657.
Corak, M. (2006). Do poor children become poor adults? Lessons from 
a cross country comparison of generational earnings mobility. In 
J. Creedy & G. Kalb (Eds.) Research on Income Inequality, Vol. 13 
Dynamics of inequality and poverty, (pp. 143-188). The Netherlands: 
Elsevier Press.
Dew-Becker, I., & Gordon, R. (2006). Where did the productivity 
growth go? Inﬂ ation dynamics and the distribution of income. In 
G. L. Perry & W. C. Brainard (Eds.), Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activities 2: 2005 (pp. 67-127). Washington, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution Press.
Easterly, W., & Rebelo, S. (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth: 
An empirical investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 
417-458.
Ellis, D. (1998). The effect of consumer interest rate deregulation on 
credit card volume, charge-offs, and the personal bankruptcy 
rate. Bank Trends, March retrieved from http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.html.
Ellison, G. T. H. (1999). Income inequality, social trust, and self-
reported health status in high-income countries. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 896, 325-328.
Engel, K. C., & McCoy, P. A. (2002). A tale of three markets: The law 
and economics of predatory lending. Texas Law Review, 80(6), 
1259-1381.
Fanning, D. (Producer) & Rummel, D. (Director). (2004). Secret 
History of the Credit Card. Frontline [Television series]. Boston & 
Washington, DC: Public Broadcasting Service.
Galbraith, J. K. (2008). The predator state. New York: The Free Press.
Gates, W. H., Sr., & Collins, C. (2002). Wealth and our commonwealth. 
Boston: Beacon Press.
Ghilarducci, T. (2008, October 7). Saving retirement in the face of 
America’s credit crisis: Short term and long term solutions. Oral 
Testimony. Committee on Education and Labor. The impact of 
the ﬁ nancial crisis on workers’ retirement security. 1:00, 2181 
Rayburn House Ofﬁ ce Building.
Glass, I. (2008, May 9). The giant pool of money. PBS: This American 
Life. 
Glassman, R. M. (1995). The middle class and democracy in socio-historical 
perspective. New York, NY: Brill.
Threatened Middle Class
Goldin, C., & Margo, R. (1992). The great compression: The wage 
structure in the United States at mid-century. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 107, 1-34.
Gordon, R. J. (1999). U.S. Economic growth since 1870: One big wave? 
American Economic Review, 89, 123-128.
Hacker, J. S. (2006). The Great American risk shift: Why American jobs, 
families, health care, and retirement aren’t secure-and how you can 
ﬁ ght back. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Hacker, J. S. (2007). The new economic insecurity—and what can be 
done about it. Harvard Law and Policy Review, 1, 111-126.
Huston, J. L. (1998). Securing the fruits of labor: The American concept 
of wealth distribution 1765-1900. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press. 
Kaplan, G. A., Pamuk, E. R., Lynch, J. W., Cohen, R. D., & Balfour, J. L. 
(1996). Inequality in income and mortality in the United States: 
analysis of mortality and potential pathways. British Medical 
Journal, 312, 999-1003.
Kawachi, I., & Kennedy, B. P. (2002). The health of nations: Why inequality 
is harmful to your health. New York: The New Press.
Kennedy, B. P., Kawachi, I., & Prothrow-Stith, D. (1996). Income 
distribution and mortality: Cross sectional ecological study of the 
Robin Hood index in the United States. British Medical Journal, 
312, 1004-1007.
Kivirmäki, M., Kinnunen, M. L., Pitkänen, T., Vahtera, J., Elovainio, 
M., & Pulkkinen, L. (2004). Contribution of early and adult factors 
to socioeconomic variation in blood pressure: Thirty-four-year 
follow-up study of school children. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66, 
184-189.
Krugman, P. (1997). The return of depression economics. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company.
Krugman, P. (2006). Graduates versus oligarchs. New York Times, 
February 27, 2006.
Krugman, P. (2007). Conscience of a liberal. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company.
Krugman, P. R., & Obstfeld, M. (2006). International economics: Theory 
and policy (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Kuttner, R. (2009, January/February). Obama’s economic opportunity. 
American Prospect, 20, 13-14.
Lantz, P. M., House, J. S., Lepkowski, J. M., Williams, D. R., Mero, R. 
P., & Chen, J. (1998). Socioeconomic factors, health behaviors, and 
mortality: Results from a nationally representative prospective 
study of US adults. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
279, 1703-1708.
Lehman, B. J., Taylor, S. E., Kiefe, C. I., & Seeman, T. E. (2005). Relation 
of childhood socioeconomic factors, health behaviors, and 
mortality: Results from a nationally representative prospective 
study of US adults. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
279, 1703-1708.
110    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Levy, F., & Temlin, P. (2007). Inequality and institutions in the 20th-
century America. MTT Department of Economic Working papers, 
no 07-17, June.
Lindert, P. (2004). Growing public, social spending and economic growth 
since the eighteenth century. Cambridge University Press.
Lipset, S. M. (1981). Political man: The social bases of politics. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lynch, J. W., Kaplan, E. R., Pamuk, E. R., Cohen, R. D., Heck, K. E., 
Balfour, J. L., & Yen, I. H. (1998). Income inequality and mortality 
in metropolitan areas of the United States. American Journal of 
Public Health, 88, 1074-1080.
Lynd, R. S., & Lynd, H. M. (1937). Middletown in transition: A study of 
cultural conﬂ icts. New York: Harvest/HBJ Books.
Madrick, J. (2002). Why economies grow. New York: NY. Basic Books 
and Century Foundation.
Madrick, J. (2007). Breaking the stranglehold on growth: Why policies 
promoting demand offer a better way for the U.S. Economy. 
Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved December 21, 2007 from 
www.epi.org.
Mankiw, N. G. (2003). Macroeconomics (5th ed.). New York: Worth 
Publishers.
Mansﬁ eld, C. L. (2000). The road to subprime “hell” was paved 
with good congressional intentions: Usury deregulation and the 
subprime home equity market. South Carolina Law Review, 51, 
473-534.
Marmot, M. (2004). The status syndrome: How social standing affects our 
health and longevity. New York: Times Books.
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Services 
Corporation, 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
McElvaine, R. S. (1993). The Great Depression. New York: Three Rivers 
Press.
Meyerson, H. (2009, January/February). A global New Deal. American 
Prospect, 20, 10-12.
Mokyr, J. (1992). Lever of riches: Technological creativity and economic 
progress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moore, B. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Boston, 
MA: Beacon Books.
Mummolo, J., & Brubaker, B. (April, 27, 2008). As foreclosed homes 
empty, crime arrives. Washington Post. Retrieved 2/25/08 
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/04/26/AR200842601288_pf.html
Murolo, P., & Chitty, A. B. (2001). From the folks who brought you the 
weekend: A short illustrated history of labor in the United States. New 
York: New Press.
Naastepad, C. W. M., & Storm, S. (2006-2007). OECD demand regimes 
(1960-2000). Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, Winter, 314-348.
North, D. C., & Thomas, R. P. (1973). The rise of the Western world: A 
new economic history. Cambridge University Press: New York.
Threatened Middle Class 111
Palley, T. I. (1998). Plenty of nothing: The downsizing of the American 
Dream and the case for structural Keynesianism. Princeton University 
Press.
Perotti, R. (1996). Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What 
the data say. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 149-187.
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth? 
American Economic Review, 84, 600-621.
Pew Research Center. (2008, April 9). Inside the middle class: Bad times 
hit the good life. A Social and Demographic Trends Report. Retrieved 
January, 14, 2009 from http://pewsocialtrends.org/pub/706/
middle_class_poll.
Phillips, K. (2007). Bad money. New York: Viking Press.
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2003). Income inequality in the United States, 
1913-1998. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVII, 1-39.
Piven, F. F. (2006). Challenging authority: How ordinary people change 
America. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littleﬁ eld.
Reich, R. B. (2007). Supercapitalism. New York: Barzoi Books.
Repetti , J. R. (2001). Democracy, taxes and wealth. New York University 
Law Review, 76, 825-873.
Ross, N., & Wolfson, J. R. (1999). Income inequality and mortality in 
Canada and the United States. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, 896, 338-340.
Salpolsky, R. (2005). Sick of poverty. Scientiﬁ c American, 293, 93-99.
Sattaur, O. (1990). WHO to speed up work on drugs for tropical 
diseases. New Scientist, 126, (April 14) 17.
Sawhill, I., & Morton, J. E. (2007). Economic mobility: Is the American 
dream alive and well? Washington, D.C.: The Pew Charitable 
Trusts. Retrieved February 2, 2008 from www.economicmobility.
org/assets/pdf/EMP%20American%Dream%20Report.pdf
Seidman, E., & Jakabovics, A. (2008). Learning from the past: The 
asset disposition experiences of Home Owners Loan Corporation, 
the Resolution Trust Corporation, and the Asset Control Area 
Program. Center for American Progress. Retrieved January 4, 2009 
from http://www.newamerica.net/ﬁ les/seidman_econ_memo.
pdf. 
Shiller, R. J. (2008). The subprime solution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Shlaes, A. (2007). The forgotten man: A new history of the great depression. 
New York: Harper.
Slemrod, J., Gale, W. G., & Easterly, W. (1995). What do cross country 
studies teach about government involvement, prosperity and economic 
growth? Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution.
Smiley, G. (2002). Rethinking the Great Depression. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. 
Dee Publisher.
Smith, A. (1936). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations. New York: Bantam Classics.
112    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Stafford, M., & Marmot, M. (2003). Neighbourhood deprivation 
and health: does it affect use all equally? International Journal of 
Epidemiology, 32, 357-366.
Steptoe, A. & Marmot, M. (2002). The role of psychobiological 
pathways in socioeconomic inequalities in cardiovascular disease 
risk. European Heart Journal, 23, 13-25.
Stratmann, T. (2005). Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review 
of the literature. Public Choice, 124, 135-156.
Sullivan, T. A., Warren, E., & Westbrook, J. L. (2000). The fragile middle 
class: Americans in debt. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sullivan, T. A., Warren, E., & Westbrook, J. L. (2006). Less stigma or 
more ﬁ nancial distress: An empirical analysis of the extraordinary 
increase in bankruptcy ﬁ lings. Stanford Law Review, 59, 212-256.
Thurow, L. C. (2003). Fortune favors the bold. New York: Harpers.
Uchitelle, L. (2007). The disposable American: Layoffs and their 
consequences. UCS Labor Books.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2005). Current population survey, 1996, 2004, and 
2005 annual social and economic supplements. U.S. Government 
Printing Ofﬁ ce: Washington, D.C.
United Nations. (2004). United Nations Human Development 
Report. New York: United Nations Development Programme. 
Retrieved February 24, 2007, from http://www.undp.org/
annualreports/2004/english/.
Warren, E. & Tyagi, A. W. (2003). The two-income trap: Why middle-class 
parents are going broke. New York: Basic books.
Whybrow, P. C. (2005). American mania: When more is not enough. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Wilkinson, R. (1992). Income distribution and life expectancy. British 
Medical Journal, 304, 165-168.
Wilkinson, R. (2005). The impact of inequality: How to make societies 
healthier. New York: The New Press.
Willcox, W. B. (Ed.). (1975). The papers of Benjamin Franklin: Volume 19, 
January 1 through December 31, 1772. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Wilson, W. (1913). The new freedom: A call for the emancipation of 
the generous energies of a people. New York: Doubleday, Page & 
Company.
Wolff, E. N. (1998). Recent trends in size distribution of household 
wealth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer, 12, (3) 131-150.
Threatened Middle Class 113
Copyright of Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare is the property of Western Michigan University and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
